Major shipping lines pivot to Indian ports as Chinese-controlled facilities show declining connectivity.
India’s maritime sector is experiencing unprecedented international investment, with over US$9 billion in commitments announced during India Maritime Week 2025, as connectivity data reveals significant underperformance across China’s vaunted String of Pearls port network in the Indian Ocean.
MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company committed 12 vessels under Indian flag, while Maersk pledged US$2 billion for port expansion at Pipavav. CMA CGM signed agreements for six LNG-powered containerships to be built at Cochin Shipyard marking the first major international order from an Indian yard. DP World announced $5 billion for infrastructure development.
These commitments directly support India’s Maritime Vision 2030, which targets 1.25 trillion rupees in port modernization and capacity expansion.
The timing is strategic as port connectivity data for Chinese-linked facilities reveals troubling trends that India is positioned to exploit.
Pakistan’s Gwadar port, China’s flagship investment under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, shows a 10.5% connectivity decline since early 2024, remaining commercially negligible despite massive infrastructure spending. Karachi, Pakistan’s primary gateway, experienced a 7.1% drop in 2025 connectivity.
Djibouti, hosting China’s only overseas military base, saw connectivity plummet 14.5% in 2025 after earlier gains, suggesting operational or geopolitical instability. Even Sri Lanka’s Colombo, the region’s dominant transshipment hub handling much of India’s own cargo, shows stagnation with minimal 3.1% growth and recent flattening performance.
The aggregate regional connectivity across these Chinese-linked ports grew only 3.3% over 18 months, with key strategic assets showing absolute decline. This validates India’s strategy of attracting commercial operators rather than pursuing state-driven infrastructure projects.
India’s investment wave directly addresses these weaknesses.
The planned transshipment hub development at Vallarpadam or Tuticorin targets recapturing the estimated 25-30% of Indian cargo currently handled by Colombo. Eastern seaboard expansion at Visakhapatnam and Paradip positions India to serve Bangladesh and Northeast India more efficiently than congested Chittagong. The geopolitical dimension centers on the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC).
With Gwadar commercially irrelevant and Red Sea routes vulnerable, Port Sudan’s connectivity spiked 18.8% likely due to crisis diversions, IMEC offers an alternative through UAE-Saudi-Jordan corridors, bypassing traditional chokepoints.
International shipping lines appear to be voting with their capital.
The preference for Indian facilities over Chinese-controlled ports signals a commercial risk assessment favoring democratic governance and operational transparency over strategic-political port control.
Maersk’s exploration of local container manufacturing and HD Hyundai’s partnership with Cochin Shipyard indicate expectations of sustained growth in India’s maritime ecosystem.
Expected next moves include accelerated transshipment terminal announcements targeting 2027-2028 operations, Bangladesh connectivity corridors integrating South Asian trade flows, and direct Middle East services bypassing traditional hubs entirely.
Technology transfer agreements suggest India aims to become a regional maritime equipment exporter, not merely an infrastructure consumer.
The strategic implication is stark: India is investing aggressively into a weakening competitive environment.
China’s String of Pearls demonstrates that massive capital deployment without commercial viability produces stranded assets. India’s commercially-driven model, supported by private international operators with proven expertise, captures actual cargo flows rather than theoretical strategic positions.
The convergence of underperforming Chinese assets and surging Indian investments marks a potential inflection point in regional maritime dominance.
